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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-TORT LIA-
BILITY-NEGLIGENCE-The New York Court of Appeals has held
that the actions of a city and county in holding out the 911 num-
ber as a number to be called by someone in need of emergency
assistance, the plaintiff's placing of a telephone call in reliance on
that holding out, and the plaintiff's further reliance on the assur-
ance that help was on its way, created a duty on the part of the
city and county to respond to plaintiff's plea for help in a non-
negligent fashion.
DeLong v. Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1982).
Prior to her death, Amalia DeLong, her husband, and their three
young children lived in Erie County, New York, at 319 Victoria
Boulevard in the Village of Kenmore, outside the City of Buffalo.'
At approximately 9:30 in the morning of October 25, 1976, Amalia
DeLong dialed 911 on her telephone.' She was immediately con-
nected to a complaint writer' and requested emergency police as-
sistance.4 The complaint writer incorrectly recorded the address
Amalia DeLong had told him, as "219 Victoria" instead of "319
1. DeLong v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (1982).
2. Id. at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
3. Id. The complaint writer's job was to receive and record complaints. As given in the
training sessions and set forth in the "Manual for 911 Services,". complaint writers were
directed to obtain exact information concerning the location of the call and to always repeat
the address of the call for verification. The four basic questions to be asked are detailed in
the manual: "1. What is the problem? - obtain this information first to determine Agency
jurisdiction. 2. Where? 3. Who is involved? 4. When did it happen?" Among the telephone
techniques and procedures for the complaint writers outlined in the manual is the direction
to "use the caller's name." Id. at 381-82, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
4. Id. at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The transcript of the call is as follows:
9:29:29 Caller: "Police?"
Complaint writer: "911."
Caller: "Police, please come, 319
Victoria right away."
Complaint writer: "What's wrong?"
Caller: "There's a burglar."
9:29:34 Complaint writer: "In there now?"
Caller: "I heard a burgler; I saw his
face in the back; he was trying to break in the house;
please come right away."




Victoria."' The call had lasted 14 seconds, during which time the
complaint writer had failed to ascertain the caller's name or the
fact that she was calling from the Village of Kenmore.6 Because
there was a Victoria Avenue in the City of Buffalo, the complaint
writer had assumed the caller lived in Buffalo.7 Thus, the com-
plaint writer routed the call on the high priority conveyor to the
Buffalo police dispatcher.8 If the call had been correctly identified
as "319 Victoria Boulevard," the complaint writer would have di-
rectly contacted the Village of Kenmore police by pressing two
buttons.9 The Kenmore police station was located approximately
1375 feet from the DeLong house.1"
Instead, at 9:31 the Buffalo police dispatcher radioed the call to
the cars on duty in the Buffalo precinct where Victoria Avenue was
located." Unable to locate "319 Victoria," one of the cars radioed
back that the highest number of the avenue was "195.1'2 The dis-
patcher released the precinct cars at 9:34 and no further action was
taken."3 This was contrary to operating procedures which called for
a follow-up in this type of situation. 4 The call was treated as a
fake. 5
At approximately 9:42, neighbors saw Amalia DeLong run from
the front of her house, naked and bleeding profusely, and then fall
onto the sidewalk." The Village of Kenmore Police Department
responded to a call for assistance by arriving at the DeLong resi-
dence within one minute. 7 At 9:53 Amalia DeLong had no vital
signs. 8 A pathologist testified that Amalia DeLong had died be-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The 911 system was located in downtown Buffalo. Id. at 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
890.
8. Id. at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889.





14. Id. at 382, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 891. In such an event, the dispatcher was required to
notify the complaint writer or the 911 lieutenant in charge, so that the tape recording of the
call could be replayed and various street guides consulted. Then other communities having
street names similar to the street name given by the caller could be immediately notified.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 379, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. Amalia DeLong received seven knife wounds. The





tween 9:42 and 9:52, with the fatal blow having been inflicted at
9:38, approximately nine minutes after she had called for help.1
In October, 1976, the Village of Kenmore, a suburb of Buffalo,
New York, was one of four communities outside the city served by
a 911 emergency telephone system.20 The system was a joint ven-
ture operated by the Central Police Services, an agency of Erie
County, in conjunction with the Buffalo Police Department.
21 It
was located in the 911 room in Buffalo Police Headquarters in
downtown Buffalo.2 2 The city police performed the dispatching
function and the county employees performed the complaint writ-
ing function, under the direct supervision of the Buffalo Police De-
partment. 23 The operating procedures in effect on October 25,
1976, required, among other things, that all complaint writers ask
the name of the caller, the exact location of the call, and repeat
this basic information back to the caller.24 The complaint writer
who received the DeLong call failed to do 80.25 Furthermore, the
dispatcher of the DeLong call ignored the required follow-up pro-
cedure in the event of not being able to locate an address.26
As a result of Amalia's death, her husband brought an action
individually and as administrator of his wife's estate against the
19. Id. at 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The pathologist reported that a person of Amalia
DeLong's size could have survived the laceration to the neck only two minutes and twenty-
five seconds to four minutes and forty-nine seconds. Id.
20. Id. at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. The purpose of the 911 emergency system is to
expedite police assistance to the communities served. The public was made aware of the 911
system by a listing on a page in the telephone book for the metropolitan area of Erie County
under the heading "Emergency Numbers." For both local and general police the number
given is "911." Id. at 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
21. Id. at 381, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
22. Id. at 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
23. Id. at 380-81, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91. Pursuant to the contract entered into in
March, 1975, the city agreed to furnish the facilities for the 911 operation at the Buffalo
police headquarters for the county employees who acted as complaint writers. The contract
also delegated the task of training, supervising, and guiding county personnel to the City
Police Department for one year from the date of its signing. After that time, it was to be
agreed upon between the two parties whether such training and supervision should con-
tinue. On October 25, 1976, the Buffalo Police Department was still training the complaint
writers. Moreover, a lieutenant of the Buffalo Police Department or an acting lieutenant was
always present in the 911 room. Id.
24. Id. at 381-82, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91. See supra note 3.
25. 89 A.D.2d at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. See supra note 4. In addition to mistakenly
recording the address on the complaint card, the complaint writer failed to follow the pre-
scribed procedures in four respects: (1) he did not ask the name of the caller; (2) he did not
determine the exact location of the call; (3) he did not address the caller by name; (4) he did
not repeat the address. 89 A.D.2d at 382, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
26. 89 A.D.2d at 382, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 891. See supra note 14.
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City of Buffalo and the County of Erie."' The Supreme Court, Erie
County, Justice Cook, entered judgment on the verdict for the hus-
band, finding both defendants co-equally liable. Two awards for
damages were granted: $200,000 for Amalia's conscious pain and
suffering and $600,000 for the wrongful death of the decedent. The
city and county appealed.2 8 On appeal the Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, unanimously affirmed the verdict for the widower as
to the award of $200,000 for conscious pain and suffering, 9 and
also upheld the award of $600,000 for the wrongful death of the
decedent.80
Writing for the majority in affirming the lower court's verdict for
Amalia's conscious pain and suffering, Justice Hancock first distin-
guished the instant case from the earlier case of Riss v. City of
New York.' 1 There the New York Court of Appeals held that a
municipality could not be held liable in tort for the failure to fur-
nish special police protection to a member of the public who had
been repeatedly threatened with personal harm and who eventu-
ally suffered serious personal injury due to a lack of such protec-
tion.8s Justice Hancock emphasized that the situation in the in-
27. 89 A.D.2d at 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
28. Id.
29. Id. Justice Hancock wrote the majority opinion in which he was joined by Justices
Dillon, Denman, Moule, and Schnepp. Id. This award for damages was founded on the pain
and suffering Amalia DeLong experienced from the intruder's savage attack. Amalia DeLong
received seven knife wounds over a period of twelve minutes. Id. at 379, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
889.
30. Id. at 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. Justice Denman wrote the majority opinion which
was joined in by Justices Dillon and Schnepp. Justices Hancock and Moule dissented in a
separate opinion written by Justice Hancock. Id. at 390, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
31. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). In Riss, the plaintiff,
Linda Riss, repeatedly pleaded with the city police to provide her with protection against a
spurned suitor who had threatened to have her killed or maimed. The city failed to provide
her with the necessary police protection. Consequently, the rejected suitor carried out his
threats, leaving Ms. Riss permanently injured. The Supreme Court, Special and Trial Term
dismissed Riss' complaint, and she appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division af-
firmed, and Riss again appealed. Judge Breitel, writing for the majority of the court, with
one dissent, affirmed the judgment of dismissal, deciding that:
[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers
of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort
liability for police protection to members of the public. Quite distinguishable, of
course, is the situation where the police authorities undertake responsibilities to par-
ticular members of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the
risks which then materialize into actual losses.
Id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958)).
32. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897.
Recent Decisions
stant case was markedly different.33 Here the police authorities
created a special relationship with particular members of the pub-
lic by establishing the 911 emergency telephone system.3 4 Once
this relationship was created between a caller and the police, a spe-
cial duty arose which made the government accountable for negli-
gence in the performance of that duty.3 Justice Hancock cited
other cases which illustrated how the development of a special re-
lationship between the police and a certain sector of the public
brings into play a concomitant special duty on the part of the gov-
ernment: those involving informers,3 6 persons under court orders of
protection, 7 and school children for whom the municipality as-
sumed the duty of providing crossing guards. 8
In considering whether Amalia DeLong was a person to whom
the municipality owed a special duty, Justice Hancock refuted the
defendants' argument that the instant case was governed by Riss.3 9
The defendants had argued that, in maintaining the 911 emer-
gency telephone system for the public-at-large, the county and city
assumed no special obligation to Amalia DeLong, unlike Schuster
v. City of New York,40 where the government reciprocally incurred
a duty to protect an informer, who, risking his life, collaborated
with the police. 1 Justice Hancock rejected their contention of no
liability by explaining that it was not the establishment of the 911
system standing alone which created a special duty, but rather the
holding out of the 911 number as one to be called to secure imme-
diate assistance which gave rise to a special duty owing to any
caller.41 This holding out induced Amalia DeLong to rely on the
33. 89 A.D.2d 383-84, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
34. Id. at 384, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
35. Id.
36. See Schuster, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80-83, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537-38, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-
71 (1958). See also Dutton v. City of Olean, 60 A.D.2d 335, 338, 401 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120
(1978). The New York Court of Appeals held that the city was under a duty to furnish
protection to police informers.
37. See Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966). In Baker,
a wife was assured of protection from her estranged husband through the issuance of a court
order.
38. See Florence v. Goldberg, 48 A.D.2d 917, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1975) in which New
York City undertook to provide crossing guard services for school children. In violation of
regulations, a crossing guard failed to inform the precinct desk officer of his absence. Thus a
substitute was not provided, resulting in the death of a child at the unprotected intersec-
tion. Id. at 917-18, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
39. 89 A.D.2d at 383-84, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
40. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
41. 89 A.D.2d at 383-84, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
42. Id. at 384, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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telephone service, and the response to her plea for emergency
help-"Okay, right away."-caused her to rely further.4
Justice Hancock pointed out that this was a case in which the
municipality voluntarily assumed a duty to a particular person
which it was obligated to perform in a non-negligent manner." Al-
though without the voluntary assumption of a duty none would
have existed,45 Justice Hancock noted that the affirmative actions
of accepting Amalia DeLong's call and transmitting her request to
the dispatcher and police cars comprised the undertaking of the
task of providing Amalia DeLong with police assistance."' By vol-
untarily assuming a duty to act, the municipality also assumed the
obligation to act with reasonable care.
The final question addressed by Justice Hancock was whether
the evidence established that the conduct of the municipality had
proceeded to the point that inaction not only deprived plaintiff of
a benefit, but actively worked an injury." In spite of the lack of
any direct evidence that Amalia DeLong had relied to her ultimate
detriment on the assurance of police protection, Justice Hancock
observed that the circumstantial evidence clearly indicated that
she did so." The fact that after having called 911, Amalia DeLong
remained defenseless in her home, instead of running out the front
door to her neighbor's home indisputably showed that the conduct
of the municipality increased her risk of danger.50
The majority also stated that the proof was sufficient to estab-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 196, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1968). See also infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
46. 89 A.D.2d at 384, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
47. Id. See Schuster, 5 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 154 N.E.2d at 541, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 274 (1958)
(McNally, J., concurring) (positing that the voluntary assumption by the City of New York
of the partial protection of a police informer carried with it the obligation not to terminate
such protection as by doing so and by publicly acknowledging his role, the government in-
creased his risk of harm). See also infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
48. 89 A.D.2d at 384-85, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892. See Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928). Justice Cardozo stated: "[i]f conduct has gone
forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in with-
holding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out
of which arises a duty to go forward." Id.
49. 89 A.D.2d at 384-85, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
50. Id. See Zibbon v. Town of Cheektowaga, 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976),
in which the New York Court of Appeals held that the failure to fulfill an undertaking to
provide police protection does not result in municipal liability unless it is shown that the
police conduct in some way increased the risk. Id. at 453, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
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lish proximate cause.51 Justice Hancock noted that where different
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the question is one for
the jury.52 The jury could have reasonably believed that without
the critical mistakes made in the acceptance and transmission of
Amalia DeLong's call for help, a Village of Kenmore Police car
would have arrived in time, at least in time to have prevented the
infliction of the fatal wound.53 Furthermore, Justice Hancock ob-
served that the evidence also supported the jury's conclusion that
the city and county were equally at fault.54
Finally, Justice Hancock maintained that the jury's award of
$200,000 for Amalia DeLong's twelve minutes of conscious pain
and suffering was not so disproportionate to her injuries so as to be
excessive.' He acknowledged that the jury properly considered the
fear and apprehension Amalia DeLong suffered during her struggle
against the murderous intruder in their assessment of the dam-
ages.56 The New York Court of Appeals thus affirmed the judg-
ment awarding Amalia DeLong's administrator $200,000 for dam-
ages for conscious pain and suffering.'7
Writing for the majority in addressing the issue of damages for
wrongful death," Justice Denman held that the jury's award of
$600,000 for the wrongful death of a 28-year-old housewife and
mother of three young children was not excessive nor the result of
an error at trial.' He explained that although the standard for re-
covery is couched in terms of pecuniary loss,60 it has long been rec-
51. 89 A.D.2d at 385, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
52. Id. at 385, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892. See Sewar v. Gagliardi, 69 A.D.2d 281, 289, 418
N.Y.S.2d 704 (1979); Pagan v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1976).
53. 89 A.D.2d at 385, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
54. Id. at 385, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
55. Id. See Juiditta v. Bethlehem Steel, 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1980). After
bring struck by a railroad car, Beverly Juiditta, age 33, was left lying on a railroad track for
approximately forty minutes before she died. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, upheld the jury's verdict of $70,000 for the conscious pain and suffering she exper-
ienced prior to her death. Id.
56. 89 A.D.2d at 385, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
57. Id. at 389, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
58. Id. at 386, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Justice Denman was joined by Justices Dillon and
Schnepp. Id. at 390, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
59. Id. at 386, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Justice Denman pointed out how decedent partici-
pated actively in raising her children by doing the cooking, cleaning, housekeeping, and
bookkeeping, and even made most of the children's clothes. Id. at 386, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
60. See N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusTS § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1981). Section 5-4.3 provides
the standard by which damages in a wrongful death action are measured. It states that the
amount of recovery is "to be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting
from the decedent's death to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought." Id.
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ognized that parental nurturing and care and other such
noneconomic benefits constitute pecuniary advantages to those so
benefited.61 Furthermore, Justice Denman held that there was no
error in allowing plaintiff to introduce expert testimony of a pro-
fessor of economics who calculated that the replacement cost of
the services performed by a housewife to a family statistically simi-
lar to that of the decedent was $527,659.62 In so holding, the major-
ity rejected the rule of Zaninovich v. American Airlines,5 which
disallowed expert testimony to show the cost of providing replace-
ment services for those of a decedent housewife. 4 Justice Denman
explained that the rule's underlying assumption, that these were
matters within the general knowledge and expertise of the jury,
was false.
Justice Hancock wrote a dissenting opinion on the issue of dam-
ages for wrongful death.66 He claimed that the excessive size of the
verdict was influenced by the lower court's error in allowing, over
objection, the expert testimony of a professor of economics who
calculated the replacement cost of Amalia DeLong's services. 67 Jus-
tice Hancock maintained that the rule established in Zaninovich
was controlling, thus making such expert testimony inadmissible.6"
61. 89 A.D.2d at 386, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 893. See Juiditta, 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d
535 (1980); Edgecomb v. Buckhout, 146 N.Y. 332, 40 N.E. 991 (1895) (trial judge committed
no error in allowing a person engaged in the business of hiring housekeepers to testify as to
the value of housekeeping services); Annot. 77 A.L.R.3d 1175 (1977) (collection of cases in
which courts addressed the issue of the admissibility or sufficiency of evidence of the value
of a deceased housewife's services).
62. 89 A.D.2d at 386, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
63. 26 A.D.2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1966). The court in Zaninovich reasoned that
the cost of providing substitute services for those of a decedent housewife was a matter
"within the common ken and subject to so many variables and choices that no objective
standards can be supplied by an expert, if one there be." Id. at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
64. 89 A.D.2d at 388-89, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
65. Id. at 387, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 894. Justice Denman also noted that the assumptions
made by the Zaninovich court that reliable expert testimony is not available and that the
subject matter does not lend itself to precise measurement are no longer true today. Fur-
ther, he observed that modern economists can calculate the cost of replacing a housewife's
services based upon empirical data. Id. at 387-88, 455 N.Y.S. 2d at 894.
66. Id. at 389, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Justices Hancock and
Moule dissented in a separate opinion written by Justice Hancock. They would have re-
versed the verdict for wrongful death and granted a new trial on damages for that cause of
action only. Id. at 390, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 389, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Justice Hancock noted
that under the rule of Zaninovich, it was error to allow expert proof as to the cost of provid-
ing a substitute for a housewife's services because of the general evidentiary proposition that
expert opinion is not admissible when the subject of inquiry is one of popular knowledge
and common sense. Id. at 389-90, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 390, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Justice Hancock further
306
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At English common law the doctrine evolved that "the King can
do no wrong," and thus it was a contradiction of his sovereignty to
allow him to be sued as of right in his own courts.69 This feudal
doctrine was slowly implanted in the democracy of the United
States, culminating in the decision in Gibbons v. United Stotes.0
There it was held that the federal government was immune from
all liability in tort.7 1 However, with the enactment of the Federal
Tort Claims Act 7 ' in 1949, a judicial remedy was made available
for the first time to those persons who suffered a tortious injury at
the hands of a government employee. 3
On the level of state government, sovereign immunity likewise
became firmly established .7 The rationale here was the same: the
king had been replaced by the people and now the people could do
no wrong.76 the immunity enjoyed by state governments, however,
has not been absolute. All states have consented to a limited form
of tort immunity by way of statutory provisions which either au-
thorized particular individuals to maintain suits or allowed suits
against the state or one of its administrative agencies in particular
types of cases.
7 6
For the most part, the states failed to heed the policy change
implemented in 1949 by the Federal Tort Claims Act, thus the an-
noted how the Zaninovich rule was recently upheld and applied in Ashdown v. Kluckhohn,
62 A.D.2d 1137, 404 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1978). 89 A.D.2d at 390, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
69. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971).
70. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868). In Gibbons, the plaintiff entered into a contract with
the United States for the delivery of fungible goods. After delivering a portion of the goods,
the plaintiff was absolved from delivering the residue, as called for by the terms of the
contract, because convenient storehouses were not available. Afterwards Gibbons consented
to deliver the remaining goods under a threat of an officer of the United States. Justice
Miller, writing for the majority of the Court, claimed that the government is not liable to
individuals for the torts committed by its officers while in its service. Id.
71. Id. at 274.
72. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1976).
73. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, §.131, at 972. See also supra note 72.
74. W. PROSSER supra note 69, § 131, at 975.
75. Id. Another argument advanced by the courts in support of the theory of sovereign
immunity was the impropriety of diverting public funds to compensate for private injuries
and the subsequent inconvenience and embarrassment to the government in doing so. Id.
See Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 P. 951 (1892); State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67, 68 (1875).
76. See Eckert, Another Decade of State Immunity to Suit 1937-1947, 2 ARK. L. Rlv.
375 (1948); Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 1363
(1954); Maguire, State Liability for Tort, 30 HARv. L. REV. 20 (1916); Nutting, Legislative
Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against the State, 4 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1939); W. PROSSER,
supra note 69, § 131, at 977; Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 242 (1942); Waterman, One Hundred Years of a State's Immunity from
Suit, 14 Tax. L. REv. 135 (1936), reprinted in 2 ARK. L. Rav. 354 (1948).
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ticipated uniform abrogation of state government immunity was
not effected.7 By 1976, however, it was reported that 24 jurisdic-
tions had legislatively or judicially abolished sovereign immunity.78
New York has a long history of restricting sovereign immunity
both judicially and legislatively. In 1842 in Bailey v. City of New
York 7 9 New York adopted the approach to state immunity of
drawing a distinction between "public" and "private" functions.80
The Bailey court chose to limit governmental immunity to those
municipal activities whose purposes were for the public good as op-
posed to the private emolument and advantage of the city: e.g.,
police, fire, public school, and courts.81 But the classification of
state functions as either public or private proved to be so difficult
that it did not provide a feasible solution to the problem. 2
In 1939, the New York legislature enacted the Court of Claims
Act,8 3 which completely waived the immunity of the State of New
York from suit.84 Later, in Bernardine v. City of New York85 this
waiver was also held to include municipalities, those creatures of
the state which act in both a corporate and governmental capacity.
Furthermore it was reaffirmed that the tort liability of the State of
New York was to be based on pure common law negligence. 86 Ac-
cordingly, in order to recover against a city or the state for negli-
gence, a plaintiff had to prove that a duty ran to him, and that
such a duty was violated, as was required in basic tort cases
77. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, § 131, at 977.
78. See Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 593 app., 544 P.2d 1153, 1158 app. (1976).
79. 3 Hill 531 (1842).
80. Id. at 539.
81. Id.
82. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, § 131, at 979. See Seasongood, Municipal Corpora-
tions: Objections to the Governmental or Propriety Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910 (1936). The
rules for making this distinction were termed "as logical as those governing French irregular
verbs." 22 VA. L. REv. at 938.
83. See N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963). It declared: "The state hereby waives
its immunity from liability and action and consents to have the same determined in accor-
dance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individ-
uals or corporations provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article." Id.
84. Id.
85. 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In Bernardine, the plaintiff instituted an ac-
tion against the City of New York for personal injuries caused by a runaway police horse. In
his opinion upholding the Appellate Division's judgment for the plaintiff, Justice Loughran
held that by New York's waiver of its state immunity with the enactment of section 8 of the
Court of Claims Act, the exemption from liability heretofore enjoyed by its subdivisions was
likewise brought to an end. Justice Loughran explained that the immunity of local govern-
mental units derived from the state's sovereign immunity. Id. at 365-66, 62 N.E.2d at 605-
06. See 161 A.L.R. 364 (1946).
86. 294 N.Y. at 365-66, 62 N.E.2d at 605.
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against individuals and private corporations."7
It was not until the decision in the landmark case, Schuster v.
City of New York,"e that the issue of duty was fully addressed. In
that case the New York Court of Appeals espoused the doctrine of
special relationship. 89 This doctrine incorporates the old rule that
the duty to furnish adequate police and fire protection runs only to
the general public, as opposed to an individual,90 by holding the
government answerable only when it has assumed a special duty
toward an individual.91 Thus, in Schuster, the City of New York
was found to be under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the
protection of an informant, since the government had actively en-
couraged him to collaborate with it in the arrest of a dangerous
criminal.92
Similarly, in a later case, Baker v. City of New York, 93 a special
duty was held to have arisen where a court had issued a protective
order for the protection of the plaintiff from her estranged hus-
band. Absent facts which showed that a special relationship ex-
isted between the plaintiff and the government, the individual was
completely barred from recovery." This requirement of a "special
87. Id.
88. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, (1958). In Schuster the New York
Court of Appeals held that the city was under a duty to furnish protection to police inform-
ers. Id. at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S. 2d at 269.
89. Id. at 82, 83, 154 N.E.2d at 538, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 271. Justice Van Voorhis found
that:
In a situation like the present, government is not merely passive; it is active in
calling upon persons 'in possession of any information. . .' to communicate such in-
formation in aid of law enforcement. Where that has happened, as here, or where the
public authorities have made active use of a private citizen in some other capacity
. ..'there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.'
Id. (quoting Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. at 167, 159 N.E. at 898 (1928)).
90. See Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). The
New York Court of Appeals held that a member of the public was not entitled to maintain
an action against defendant water company which had contracted with the city to furnish
water at hydrants. Plaintiff sued for damages resulting from a fire due to defendant's failure
to supply sufficient pressure. The court of appeals dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract
count on the basis that no intention appeared in defendant's contract that it should be
answerable to individual members of the public for losses ensuing from its failure to fulfill
its promise. Also the court held that the action was not maintainable as one for common-law
tort. Justice Cardozo explained that the failure to furnish an adequate supply of water was
at most the denial of a benefit, not the commission of a wrong, thus not bringing the case
within the ambit of the tort rule that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully. Id. at 164-70, 159 N.E. at 897-99.
91. 5 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70.
92. Id.
93. 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966).
94. Id. at 771, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (quoting Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d
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duty" as opposed to a "public duty" has limited New York's statu-
tory waiver of state immunity by still exempting cities and munici-
palities from liability to the general public for failing to provide
adequate police or fire protection."'
The rule of finding no duty on the part of the municipality for
the failure to furnish general police protection was the turning
point of the decision in Riss v. City of New York. 9e There the court
found that the city had not incurred any legal responsibility by
failing to provide Ms. Riss with protection because the police au-
thorities had not undertaken any responsibility toward Ms. Riss.97
The police authorities did nothing, in spite of Riss' repeated com-
plaints; they never assured her of police assistance either explicitly,
or as in the case of Schuster, implicitly.98 Consequently, Ms. Riss
never relied to her detriment on any promise made by the govern-
ment.99 This is in direct contrast to the case of Amalia DeLong
who relied to her ultimate detriment on the assurances of police
protection made to her by the 911 system.'"0
In a dissenting opinion in Riss, Judge Keating claimed that the
134, 139, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (1965) (a municipality is not liable for
failure to supply general police or fire protection); Schuster, 5 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d
at 536-37, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268, 269, supra note 88; Farmer v. City of New York, 23 A.D.2d
638, 256 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1965) (plaintiffs granted a new trial enabling them to freely put forth
a prima facie case that their injuries suffered in a City park resulted from the City's failure
to provide adequate police protection).
95. See e.g., Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945). In Steitz
plaintiffs complained of property damages suffered as a result of a fire which destroyed their
property because of the carelessness and negligence of the city in failing to create and main-
tain an adequate fire department, and contended that the defendant breached its statutory
duty to maintain a fire department. Id. at 54, 64 N.E.2d at 705. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the negligent violation of municipal duties which are intended to serve
the public created no civil liability of the municipality to individuals. Id. at 56, 64 N.E.2d at
706. See also 163 A.L.R. 342 (1946).
96. See 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). This was an action
by a woman, who was injured by a former suitor, against the city of New York for refusing
to furnish police protection upon her request. The Supreme Court, Special and Trial Term,
dismissed her complaint, and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division
affirmed, and the plaintiff again appealed. Id. at 579, 240 N.E.2d at 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d at
897. The Court of Appeals in an opinion written by Justice Breitel, held that the city was
not liable for failing to supply the police protection the plaintiff had demanded. Id. at 58.
293 N.Y.S.2d at 899, 240 N.E.2d at 861.
97. Id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899. See supra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
98. Id. In Schuster, the New York Court of Appeals held that where persons assist in
the apprehension or prosecution of criminals, a reciprocal duty arises on the part of society
to use reasonable care for their police protection, at least where reasonably demanded or
sought. 5 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70 (1958).
99. 22 N.Y.2d at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
100. See 89 A.D.2d 376, 384-85, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892.
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state was, in effect, delimiting the consequences of the state's
waiver of immunity by making a distinction between special and
public duties. 10 1 He would have allowed the legal principles of neg-
ligence (such as fault and proximate cause) to keep liability within
reasonable bounds, rather than deny a plaintiff his day in court by
dismissing his complaint on the grounds that the duty to furnish
police and fire protection runs to the general public and not to any
individual.1 0 2 He believed that the government employees involved
in Riss could have been found to have acted negligently, because
with actual notice of danger and ample time to investigate Ms.
Riss' complaints, a reasonable person would have taken some re-
medial action.103 Judge Keating predicted that the day is forth-
coming when society will demand that the government, in carrying
out its diverse functions, be held accountable for the negligent acts
of its employees, as is a private employer. "
In line with the decision in Riss, a recent case, Weiner v. Metro-
politan Transportation Authority,105 reaffirmed the principle that,
absent facts establishing a special relationship between the police
and the injured plaintiff, there is no duty on the part of the munic-
ipality to protect him, and thus no liability.106
The cases wherein a special relationship has been held to exist
have fallen into two categories: (1) those in which the municipality
has held itself out as providing a special service to a certain class
of persons,107 and (2) those in which the governmental unit has af-
101. See 22 N.Y.2d at 592, 240 N.E.2d at 907, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899. (Keating, J., dis-
senting). Justice Keating noted that although the common law doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity supposedly died with the broad language of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act of
1939, it has been kept alive under the guise of "public duty." He reasoned that to say that
there is no duty, is to start with the conclusion, and that, having undertaken to provide
professional police and fire protection, municipalities should not be able to escape liability
for damages caused by their failure to do even a minimally adequate job of it. He stated
that a better approach to the issue 8f municipal tort liability is to allow the ordinary princi-
ples of tort law to limit liability rather than the fiction that there is no duty running to the
general public. Id. at 585, 591-93, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 866-67, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901, 906-07
(Keating, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 593-94, 240 N.E.2d at 868, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 908 (Keating J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 590, 240 N.E.2d at 866, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating J., dissenting).
105. 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). In Weiner, a woman
had her purse strap and wrist slashed as she entered a New York City subway. Because
there was no evidence that the defendant, New York City Transit Authority, had estab-
lished a special relationship with the plaintiff, it escaped liability. Rather the Authority was
held to be acting with only a general duty to provide police protection to its customers. Id.
at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
106. Id. at 178, 433 N.E.2d at 125, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
107. See, e.g., Florence v. Goldberg, 48 A.D.2d 917, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1975), in which
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firmatively and voluntarily undertaken a responsibility to provide
particular individuals with police protection.10 8 Unlike Riss, De-
Long presented both situations. As the New York Court of Appeals
underscored in DeLong, the unifying principle of these two groups
is reliance.109 Once the municipality has taken steps which, in turn,
induce reliance on the part of the individual, the municipality
must carry out its activity in a nonnegligent fashion or liability will
follow. As enunciated in DeLong, the responsibility brought about
by creating reliance cannot be shirked by the government under
the guise of "public duty." 110
Like the school child in Florence"' for whom the special service
of crossing guards was voluntarily made available, Amalia DeLong
was a member of a class of persons (those in need of immediate
police assistance) which the 911 emergency telephone system was
intended to serve. This service was held out to the public by,
among other things, a listing in the area telephone books under the
heading "Emergency Numbers."'' A promise was made and adver-
tised by the state subdivisions that the most efficient way to re-
ceive a rapid, expert response to a plea for help was to dial "911"
rather than the local police. This holding out of the 911 number as
one to be called by someone in need of assistance, and Amalia De-
Long's acceptance of the invitation of 911, made the government
amenable for its failure to render such service with reasonable
care.
Moreover, once Amalia DeLong's call reached "911", a second
basis upon which a special duty may be founded arose. A special
relationship has been recognized whenever the government has un-
dertaken responsibility toward an individual by specifically assur-
ing him of protection."' Amalia DeLong received such assurance
New York City undertook to provide crossing guard services to school-age children. In viola-
tion of regulations, a crossing guard failed to inform the precinct desk officer of his absence.
Thus a substitute was not provided, resulting in the death of a child at the unprotected
intersection. Id. at 917-18, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
108. See, e.g., Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966). A
wife was assured of protection from her estranged husband through a court order, creating a
special duty on the part of the government to provide such protection. Id.
109. 89 A.D.2d at 384, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
110. Id.
111. 48 A.D.2d 917, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1975). See supra note 107.
112. 89 A.D.2d at 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
113. See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154
N.E.2d 534 (1975) (city was under a duty to provide protection to police informers); Baker
v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966) (issuance of a court order
created a special duty on the part of the government to provide such protection). See also
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when the complaint writer answered to her: "Okay, right away."
DeLong was told to rely further upon the initial promise of imme-
diate police assistance.""
In either case, it is clear that DeLong falls within the ambit of
the special relationship doctrine. This was not a case of the failure
of the municipality to furnish police protection owed to the public
generally, but rather a case where the municipality chose to estab-
lish and hold out a special service of protection to the public. " '
The promise of assistance so held out was then later reaffirmed by
an agent of the government. This special protection which was ad-
vertised and unequivocally assured to Amalia DeLong was never
delivered, thus making the government accountable for its breach
of the special duty it had created.
As much as DeLong adheres to the traditional case law in this
area, it also enunciates an expansion of the special relationship
doctrine. It is noteworthy that the DeLong court focused its analy-
sis on the element of reliance. The message is clear, at least in New
York, that the courts will recognize and protect the plaintiffs in-
terest of reasonable reliance, notwithstanding the claim of "public
duty." What distinguishes DeLong from previous cases is that a
special relationship was held to exist between the public and the
government. Other cases have held the government amenable only
when it has assumed a special duty toward particular individuals" 6
or toward a sector of the public," 7 but not when it has merely
taken on a special duty toward the public-at-large. Herein lies the
uniqueness of DeLong. It has addressed the question of whether, in
the State of New York, under the special relationship doctrine, the
government can ever be liable for the breach of a duty of due care
owing to the public in general.
Zibbon v. Town of Cheektowaga, 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152, appeal dismissed, 39
N.Y. 2d 1056, 355 N.E.2d 388, 387 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1976). In Zibbon, the town police affirma-
tively undertook to protect the plaintiff's intestates, Mr. and Mrs. Deyo, from a dangerous
criminal who was known to be intent on killing Mrs. Deyo. The police provided protection
to Mr. and Mrs. Deyo for a period of hours, and then withdrew the protection without
notifying them. They were subsequently murdered. The New York Supreme Court Appel-
late Division reversed the order of Special Term which had dismissed the complaint and
entered summary judgment for the defendants. The majority found that there were triable
issues of fact as to whether the Police Department had assumed a special duty toward Mr.
and Mrs. Deyo by their actions. 51 A.D.2d at 453-54, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
114. 89 A.D.2d at 378, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying
text.
115. 89 A.D.2d at 384, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
116. See supra note 113.
117. See supra note 107.
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The DeLong court's approach makes sense. It is an impossible
task for a police force to furnish all members of the public ade-
quate police protection in all instances.118 Yet if the government
decides to break down its general service of protection into special-
ized services and invites the public to rely upon these services, the
government invokes a duty of due care owing to the public in ful-
filling these tasks. Whether the government wishes to classify any
given service as a public or private one is irrelevant once it has
induced reliance on the part of an individual, as it will be held
accountable for the torts of its agents. What New York now has is
a "reliance duty,""' rather than a special duty. In essence, the ele-
ment of reliance has been the common thread running through all
the cases in which a special duty has been found. Whenever the
government takes any affirmative action which invokes reliance on
the part of an individual, it will forfeit the defense of governmental
immunity.1 20
By its decision in DeLong, the State of New York has most cer-
tainly taken an important step forward in ridding itself of the ob-
solescent, judicially invoked doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
area of negligence. However, notwithstanding the demise of "pub-
lic duty" and the focus on the element of reliance, one evasion of
tort liability still exists: nonfeasance. As in Riss"" and Weiner,1
2 if
the government chooses not to act, no reliance is induced, and thus
the government cannot be held liable for negligence. This is in di-
rect contrast to the private employer, who, with notice of a need
for action, and ample time to take such action, can readily be held
accountable for an unreasonable failure to act.123 Thus as much as
DeLong moves the State of New York a step forward in carrying
118. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 81, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-70 (1958).
119. See Dutton v. City of Olean, 60 A.D.2d 335, 338, 401 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (1978). In
Dutton, a person who was shot by a sniper brought an action against the city of Olean to
recover damages for his injuries, claiming that the city had a special duty to protect him
from the sniper and negligently failed to perform such duty. The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that the evidence was insufficient to show any special duty to plain-
tiff. Writing for the majority, Justice Denman described this special duty as a "reliance
duty" in that such a duty to an individual is born of a situation wherein the municipality
acts affirmatively, thereby inducing reliance on the part of the individual. Id. at 338, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 120.
120. SeeZibbon, 51 A.D.2d at 453, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 156, appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d
1056, 355 N.E.2d 388, 387 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1976). See also supra note 113.
121. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). See supra note 96.
122. 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). See supra note 105.
123. W. PRossER, supra note 71, § 56, at 341-42.
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out its legislative repeal of sovereign immunity,124 there still exists
a viable loophole for state impunity.
In view of the surmounting criticism " of the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, it is no surprise that a recent decision
has expanded the governmental base of liability. The arguments
made in behalf of governmental immunity have all proved to be
skewed toward emotion rather than fact. 26 With the availability of
public liability insurance, and in view of the constructive effects
tort liability has had in the private sector,12 7 it only follows that
society will no longer tolerate state impunity. In this age of risk-
spreading, it is absurd that a tortious loss suffered by an individual
is borne by one, rather than by many. 2 ' The effect of such a prac-
tice has been to enable the government to hide the real costs of its
incompetency. 29
124. See N.Y.CT. CL. Act § 8 (McKinney 1963). See supra note 83.
125. See e.g., Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J. 131
(1952); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt. 7), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577
(1928); Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734
(1928); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 6 & 5), 36 YAE L.J. 1 (1926),
36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927), 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 229 (1925); David, Municipal
Liability in Tort in California, (pts. 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5), 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (1933); 7 S. CAL. L.
REV. 48 (1933), 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 214 (1934), 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 295 (1934), 7 S. CAL. L. Rav.
372 (1934); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 H~Av. L. REV. 437
(1941); Green, Freedom of Litigation (III), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL L. REV. 355
(1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4. ILL. L. Q. 28 (1921); Repko,
American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 214 (1942); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1949);
Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28 VA. L. REV. 360 (1942).
126. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education, 453 Pa. 584, 595-96, 305 A.2d 877,
882 (1973). In Ayala, the common law doctrine of governmental immunity was abolished in
Pennsylvania. In his opinion, Justice Roberts noted that there is no sound reason today why
governmental units should escape tort liability. He explained that the arguments made in
behalf of governmental immunity-that the courts will be flooded with litigation against the
state and that governmental units cannot carry on their functions if money raised by taxa-
tion is diverted to the payment of claims--have all proved to be unsupported by empirical
data. Id.
In 1980, the Pennsylvania Legislature reinstated limited sovereign immunity at PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§8521, 8522 (Purdon 1982).
127. See Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 590, 240 N.E.2d at 865-66, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating,
J., dissenting). He observed that the imposition of tort liability has had many healthy side
effects on society by forcing the private sector to follow certain, established standards of
conduct in order to avoid paying pecuniary damages. Id.
128. See Ayala, 453 Pa. at 595, 305 A.2d at 881. See supra note 129.
129. See Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 589-90, 240 N.E.2d at 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating,
J., dissenting). Justice Keating believed that the City of New York and other municipalities
have been able to engage in "a sort of false bookkeeping in which the real costs of inade-
quate or incompetent police protection have been hidden by charging the expenditures to
the individuals who have sustained catastrophic losses rather than to the community where
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New York has wisely looked to the elastic concept of duty to
define the judicial reach of its statutory waiver of immunity. Tra-
ditionally this element has expanded and contracted to meet
changing economic and social mores.30 Thus the duty analysis pos-
ited by the courts of New York offers a ready device for New York
to judicially abolish all vestiges of governmental immunity when-
ever its residents demand no less. The court in DeLong has made a
marked stride in that direction.
Robin Graziano
it belongs, because the latter had the power to prevent the losses." Id.
130. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, § 53.
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